China's Progressing while Regressing

"China is Paying the Price of Social Unrest"

The author of this article, Pei, brings up a very interesting and paradoxical point regarding China's transformation in recent decades. China, yes, has definitely grown economically, industrially, and technologically. However, I honestly believe this was something the state desired and instituted.
My basis for this assumption comes from Pei's article. He states that the number of social uprisings has shown staggering increases in recent years.

The number of so-called "mass incidents" (sit-ins, riots, strikes, and demonstrations) reached 74,000 is 2004, an all-time high, and involved about 3.7m individuals. In 1994, by comparison, there were about 10,000 such incidents, with 730,000 participants.

Pei also notes that the triggers for these incidents are social and economic policies, such as high tax and land seizures, that help to facilitate the economic and industrial growth of China. Chinese people may not agree with how their country is changing and be angry that they must pay the price regardless.

This could be avoided with social care of people but such a climate is not present. China does not care for its poor, aging, or other interest groups and so the Chinese people feel they are taken from without being given anything. It's no wonder they are acting out more and more each year.

China wants to fix this so they can have a good reputation with the rest of the world. However, this is not a good reason as this, too, is a corrupt endeavor. The government is corrupt and just wants band-aids for the problems that can easily save face but do not fix the problems (i.e. publicly punish a select few officials while letting other continue their corrupt ways). If this continues, then the protests will, too.

How China and the U.S. view the "China Threat"

Reving up the China Threat

In Klare's article regarding how the U.S. defines and is reacting to the rise of China as a superpower, he asks the great question of is China a threat just to the economy of the U.S. and its current position of dominance or does China threaten the security of the U.S. as a state? Also interesting to note is that he separates the two. This leads me to believe that the article focuses on the traditional and dominant discourse of security as solely focusing on military action. However, he also notes that the U.S. will react to economic threats with military force, thus alluding to the idea that security threats can now come from sources other than military action but cannot be resolved in such means yet.

Currently, the U.S. has a system for deciding if another nation-state is posing a threat to security. The criteria are whether the state is becoming a "new rival," is capable of world power, resembles the likes of the Soviet Union, during the Cold War, and is taking in resources and supplies to prepare for military action.

This leads Klare to believe that the U.S. is labeling the Chinese state as a threat to U.S. security. The basis for placing this label rests of a few key issues. First of all, China has been cited as building up its missile and weapon reserves and increasing the missile range around its state. A report filed annually by the government shows that China is growing its missile program. China has begun to purchase submarines, fighter planes, and destroyers. Also, the U.S. claims that the missiles are being aimed at the U.S.'s allies. China has recently been able to afford missiles from Russia capable of reaching Japan and Taiwan.

A good point, to which I agree, that officials in Beijing make for taking such action to build a military defense is just that. It's for China's defense. Klare notes that China is afraid it is being contained and threatened by the bases the U.S. has built around then and the missiles being constantly being pointed at them. This has caused China to be insecure in its own security and has naturally began to take measures to protect themselves. Of course, as Klare also notes,

But any nation, when confronted with a major military buildup by a potential adversary off its shores, is bound to feel threatened and will act accordingly.

Simply put, the reason for China having a missile program is the U.S. started it and the Chinese are just reacting.

Finally, the U.S. is worried because China has tried to buy out a small California-based oil company and is threatening to change the flow of oil distribution throughout the whole world. It is well-known that oil is not an infinite resource and is the most demanded raw material in the world. This makes the good a source of life and power in the world. Since China has grown, it has increased its oil consumption tremendously without the prospect of more oil being created in the world. Now, the U.S. is feeling threatened that China will take away the oil America needs and, thus, shift its position of power to below China. This shows that the actors remain the two states (China vs. U.S.) but the issue of security now moves into new, economic, territory. To the U.S., if China starts to ally with Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich, yet troubled nations, this will threaten the economic and military power the U.S. has had in the past.

However, it is interesting to note here that even though the security issue here is not over a military threat, the U.S.'s solution is still to use military force. Klare goes on to note that U.S. will kill the threat by placing more bases around China and maintain its superiority in military technology. The feeling I get from the article is that the U.S.'s notion of China as a threat still pits state against state and focuses on both military and economic threats. What the U.S. leaves out that should be prominent in the modern notion of security is including oil businesses, individuals, and MNCs as actors and using means other than military to react the the threat perceive from China.

Discourses of Security in China: Towards a critical turn?

After reviewing how the U.S. perceives security regarding China, I looked at how China views the notion of security of itself against others. Clearly, China's notion matches the U.S. in that it believes security lies solely in protecting one's state against the threat of another state, although this is not openly stated in Zhang;s article.

China is a very insecure nation for the reasons Klare states in his article. China is seen as a global threat by other nations for the fact that China is a rising power, and non-democratic at that. Thus, China's view on security is forced to be a reactionary one. China knows that the global economy and identity can impact their security but officials in Beijing have to focus on military because it seems to be the most immediate and dangerous threat at this time.

It's important to look at the history and environment of China to correctly understand their view on security. China was never a wealthy nation but is becoming one. Also, China knows we are in a post-Cold War era and its identity as a communist nation automatically labels it a threat to liberal, democratic nations of the world. So, the view from state actors is that China is being looked at even more closely that any other nation.

Chinese scholars have not put much work into the field of security yet, so all of their notions are based on security of past eras. However, new discourses are emerging and China is waiting to see where this leaves them. There is a possibility, as Zhang states, of superpowers falling to a level where multiple powers can emerge and be on a more level field. This multi-polarity will change the actors of security (perhaps make room for more individual and community actors) and also what security entails (protection of resources, economy, etc. will be included). Or, will security only expand to other areas but not other actors?

Security in China is very complex and still unknown. Currently, China is in reactionary mode to the rest of the world's disdain for non-democratic ideals. However, if China's economic power grows and it is able to become an even player on the global stage, this notion may change and security will then start to encompass ideas other than military and actors other than states.

The Weight of History

A nation's history helps to shape the way external forces impact it.

It is very bold to say that whether or not a nation can be conquered by another is the prey's own fault. However, this can be partly true. Many nations have been threatened and conquered by imperial forces while others have resisted. The same forces can be said to have been exerted on them and yet the product differs entirely from situation to situation. Beeson, the author of this article Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, states that a nation's history, characteristics, and people impact their future contacts with outside parties tremendously. I believe I can agree with that.

China

"... Response to the European challenge was a consequence of internal degeneration, rather than simple European superiority" (pg. 31). This was the reason Beeson gives for China's submission to European dominance in the 1800s after the fall of the Ming Dynasty. China is historically ethnocentric, divided, and introverted. This made a very good environment for the Europeans to permeate and weaken from within. Yes, it can be said that European forces were very strong. But, China was so characteristically weak that they fell more quickly, than, say, Japan.

It's interesting that Beeson blames Confuscian thought and an air of superiority of the Chinese for their fall to a elite and self-superior power like Europe. Essentially the Chinese refused to give in a little of their customs and greatness in order to be spared total domination but thus subjected themselves more easily to such a fate. I do not think we can seprate China's history and Europe's history from placing blame for China's fall. I believe it was the interaction of the two that produced this result. China's superiority complex and resistance angered the Europeans moreso than any other nation simply because Europe thought itself and its ideas to also be superior. What I mean is, not only was China's weakness a cause of their downfall but also Europe's increased motivation to dominate China even more forcefully. China's weakness made Europe even stronger. Thus, European action played off of Chinese culture to create a shared outcome between the two actors.

Japan

Japan contrasts greatly to China and thus their fate in the imperial era reflects it. Europe did not see that Japan was just as literate as they were and believed Japan to be worthless to them. Also, Japan allowed Europe to trade and exchange ideas with them a little more openly. Thus, Europe attempts to dominate and threaten Japan's security were less because Japan was less susceptible to collapse with an open mind. Also, Europe was not challenged to work harder to secure Japan because this nation was not a elusive as China. Again, Beeson makes the point that a nation's history changes how its future will be controlled.

Not only does this allow Japan to hold its own against European domination. Japan also becomes a center of competition and rivalry with China. The nation, allowing itself to stay afloat by accepting some Western ideals, is free to dominate parts of Asia as well. This sets Japan up to be just like Europe in its quest to take over other lands rather than be taken over themselves. Japan begins to take on the same goals and means as European imperialists within the Asian region. Thus, the way Japan interacted with the rest of Asia then and now is reflected in their past reaction to potential European threats.

This historical resistance by Japan helped give the nation a reputation for asserting Asia's worth in many areas and also for going against Western influence. This helped them to stop external domination but also caused them to be resented by the rest of East Asia. China for trying to take over certain regions and Southeast Asia for exploiting its resources. Then and now, Japan can be noted as having a sense of superiority and higher value than other Asian nations. I think this is definetly the case as much of the world sees how greatly Japan differs from the rest of Asia in all areas of living.

I'm not sure how this article ties into the Olympics article yet. All I can note is that it shows how the Olympics can have a huge diplomatic effect on the region. The region is characterized by instability and poor regional relations. Thus, it makes sense that sports diplomacy could potentially improve their ties moreso than other, more stable regions. The fact that China has been a historically weak area for others to prey on makes it a hotbed for controversy during the Olympics as the nation tries to show the world it will no longer allow this.